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JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT IN REPRESENTATIVE
SUITS
By WILLIAM WIRT BLUME*
T HIS discussion has as its cenfer the problem of whether the
claims of joined plaintiffs may be aggregated to constitute
the amount required for jurisdiction in cases in which one or more
may sue for the benefit of all. Federal cases are discussed almost
exclusively because of the importance of the problem in federal
practice and'because of the confusion and conflicts found in the
authorities.
A general test for determining when claims of joined plain-
tiffs may be aggregated for the purposes of jurisdiction was laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1916:
"The settled rule is that when two or more plaintiffs having
separate and distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential
that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount;
but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right
in which they have a common and undivided interest, is is enough
if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount."'
In an earlier case the test was stated in part as follows:
"If several persons be joined in a suit in equity or adrfiiralty,
and have a common and undivided interest, though separable as
between themselves, the amoaint of their joint claim or liability
will be the test of jurisdiction."'2
In cases in which some of a class may properly sue for the
benefit of all, "though the rights of the several persons may be
separate and distinct," "there must be a common interest or
common right, which the bill seeks to establish and enforce."3 In
a case at circuit Mr. Justice Nelson stated that the interest which
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
'Pinel v. Pinel, (1916) 240 U. S. 594, 596, 36 Sup. Ct. 416, 417, 60
L. Ed. 817.
-Clay v. Field, (1891) 138 U. S. 464, 479, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. Ed.
1044.
sSmith v. Swormstedt, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 288, 302, 14 L. Ed. 942.
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will enable the court to dispense with the presence of all the
parties, when numerous, except a determinate number, is not only
"an interest in the question, but one in common in the subject-
matter of the suit."'4 This view was quoted with approval by
Mr. Justice Shiras in 1897,5 but in 1912 the equity rules provided
that some may sue for all "when the question is one of common
or general interest."'
From the above statements it appears that a representative suit
may be employed only when the joined plaintiffs are seeking to
enforce some "common interest" or "'common right" or h ave a
''common interest in the subject-matter" or "question" before the
court, and that the claims of joined plaintiffs may be aggregated
for the purposes of jurisdiction when the plaintiffs unite to en-
force a "single title or right" in which they have a "common and
undivided interest." It appears, also, that in either case the inter-
ests of the plaintiffs may be separate as among themselves.
The general tests for permitting the use of representative suits
and for allowing aggregation of interests for purposes of juris-
diction being apparently identical, the conclusion would seem to
follow that whenever a representative suit is properly employed
the value of the interests of the plaintiffs as a group should be
deemed the amount in dispute rather than the value of the sep-
arate interests of the individual plaintiffs. It is the writer's view
that this conclusion should follow in each sich case, but a refer-
ence to the decisions will show that in many cases where repre-
sentative suits have been employed, either properly or without
objection, permission to aggregate the interests has been denied.
CREDITORS' SUITS
In the comparatively recent case of Lion Bonding & Surety
Co. v. Karate a non-judgment creditor sought to have certain
assets of a foreign corporation placed in the hands of receivers
for the benefit of creditors. The plaintiff alleged that his complaint
was on behalf of himself and all other parties similarly situated,
but asked that the amount due him be ascertained and declared
4Cutting v. Gilbert, (C.C.N.Y. 1865) 5 Blatch. 259, 261, Fed. Cas. No.
3,519.
5Scott v. Donald, (1897) 165 U. S. 107, 115, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41 L. Ed.
648. 6Rule 38.
7(1923) 262 U. S: 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 480, 67 L. Ed. 871.
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a first lien upon the assets. Mr. Justice Brandeis remarked that
the case was not like those "in which several plaintiffs, having a
common undivided interest, unite to enforce a single title or right,
and in which it is enough that their interests collectively equal the
jurisdictional amount." He also said:
"In the case at bar, if several creditors of the company, each
with a debt less than $3,000, had joined as plaintiffs, the demands
could not have been aggregated in order to confer jurisdiction.
Nor can Karatz's allegation that he sued on behalf of others simi-
larly situated help him."
While the plaintiff in the above case undertook to sue for the
benefit of all similarly situated it is very doubtful whether he
could be considered as representing any class of the defendant's
creditors. Not having reduced his claim to judgment it would
have been necessary for him to establish it in the suit, and in this
contest no other creditor would have had any interest whatsoever.
Furthermore, his demand that his claim be declared a first lien on
the assets seems inconsistent with his allegation that he was suing
for the benefit of all. As a non-judgment creditor he could not
properly represent judgment creditors, and since only the latter
could maintain a creditors' bill, he had no standing in equity either
individually or as a representative. If Karatz had been qualified
to represent the other creditors there was nothing to show that
other creditors would come in with claims sufficient in amount to
aggregate the minimum required for jurisdiction. Only by join-
ing others with him as named plaintiffs would this have appeared,
but even if he had done so it would have been unavailing accord-
ing to the opinion of the court.
In Stewart v. Duniham, decided by the Supreme Court in 1885,8
a bill had been filed by some creditors on behalf of themselves and
"all other creditors who might come in and share the costs of the
litigation," to reach property of the debtor alleged to have been
fraudulently transferred. Some of the creditors proved up claims
amounting to less than $5,000 and as to them it was held that the
defendants could not appeal. "The matter in dispute as between
the defendants and each, of the plaintiffs was the amount of the
claim of that plaintiff." 9 The first case cited as authority for the
holding was Seaver v. Bigelows in which actual joinder in a
8(1885) 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed. 329.
gComment on Stewart v. Dunham, (1885) 115 U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct.
1163, 29 L. Ed. 329, found in Gibson v. Shufeldt, (1887) 122 U. S. 27,
39, 7 Sup. Ct. 1066, 30 L. Ed. 1083.
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creditors' bill was characterized as being "permitted by the mere
indulgence of the court, for its convenience, and to save ex-
pense.""o
In the leading case of Clay v. Field," Mr. Justice Bradley
gave a list of the "principal cases" in wh:.ch the interest of the
parties had been deemed "common and undivided" for the pur-
poses of jurisdiction. In this list was Handley v. Stuts," a cred-
itors' suit decided earlier at the same term of court. In Handley
v. Stutz several judgment creditors, for themselves and all other
creditors, brought suit against a corporation and sixteen of its
stockholders alleged to have paid nothing for their stock to require
such stockholders to pay the sums due by them, and prayed that
the fund so realized be administered by the court for the benefit
of the creditors of the corporation. After pointing out that a
-bill of this kind could only be maintained by one or more creditors
in behalf of all, and not by any one creditor to secure payment
of his own debt to the exclusion of others, Mr. Justice Gray said:
a. As to trial court's jurisdiction:
"The sums alleged to be due from the corporation to the orig-
inal plaintiffs amounting to more than $2,000 the circuit court had
jurisdiction of the case, and authority to administer and distribute
the amounts, due from the individual defendants to the corpora-
tion for unpaid subscriptions to stock as a trust fund for the bene-
fit of all the creditors of the corporation, and for that purpose
to permit creditors, who had not originally joined in the bill, to
come in and prove their claims before a master."
b. As to appellaie court's jurisdiction:
"The trust fund so administered and ordered to be distributed
by the, circuit court amounting to much more than $5,000, the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is not affected by the fact that
the amounts decreed to some 3 of the creditors are less than that
sum. It was immaterial to appellants how the sums decreed to be
paid by them should be distributed, and (which is more decisive)
such a bill as this could not have been filed by one creditor in his
own behalf only, and the case does not fall under that class in
which credit6rs, who might have stied -severally, join in one bill
for convenience and to save expense."
The features which distinguish Handley v. Stutz from cred-
10(1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 208, 18 L. Ed. 595.
31(1891) 138 U. S. 464, 480, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. Ed. 1044.
12(1890) 137 U. S. 366, 11 Sup. Ct. 117, 34 L. Ed. 706.
"3The word "some" must have been used inadvertently as no claim as
'allowed by the master's report exceeded $5,000.
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itors' suits in which claims of creditors cannot be aggregated for
the purposes of jurisdiction were neatly summed up by a lower
federal court in a case deemed similar to Handley v. Stutz. The
judge said:
"Here, as in Haiadley v. Stutz, the fund sought to be dis-
tributed is in excess of the jurisdictional amount; and the claims
of all the claimants are in the aggregate more than that amount; it
is immaterial to the defendant how the sums . . . should be dis-
tributed; and this bill . . . could not have been filed by one cred-
itor solely in his own behalf. ' 14
(a) Amount of Trust Fund.-The reference made in Handley
v. Stutz to the fact that the trust fund amounted to more than
$5,000 is significant, but easily misunderstood. If the trust fund
bad not exceeded $5,000 no matter how large the claims of the
creditors had been, either singly or in the aggregate, the amount
in controversy would not have been sufficient. In a number of
cases the chancery court of early New York held that claims of
creditors could be added to obtain the amount required for juris-
diction," but it also held that the property of the debtor, as claimed
by the complaint, had to exceed the required amount in value.1 "
On the other hand, if the claims of the creditors, when added, had
fallen short of the minimum required, it is equally plain that the
court would not have bad jurisdiction as the creditors would
have been entitled to recover judgment only for the amounts
of their claims no matter how large the fund had been.
(b) Claims of "Original" Plaintiffs.-As to the trial court's
jurisdiction, it was said: "The sums alleged to be due from the
corporation to the original plaintiffs amounting to more than
$2,000 the circuit court had jurisdiction." From this statement it
is apparent that it was not the amount of the trust fund, but the
amount claimed by the "original" plaintiffs, which determined
jurisdiction.1 7 At the beginning of the suit only the claims of the
named or "original" plaintiffs were known and could be evaluated.
While all the other creditors were represented and had a right to
'
4jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., (C.C. Del. 1903) 123 Fed. 506, 514.
"sDix v. Briggs, (1842) 9 Paige (N.Y.) 595; Sizer v. Miller, (1842)
9 Paige (N.Y.) 605; Bailey v. Burton, (1831) 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 339.
'
0 Smets v. Williams, (1834) 4 Paige (N.Y.) 364; Van Cleef v. Sickels,(1834) 2 Edw. (N.Y.) 392.
17Furthermore, the court said: "The contest is upon the sufficiency
in amount of the creditors' claims to support the jurisdiction of the circuit
court in the first instance, and of this court on appeal."
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come in, the amounts of their claims were unknown until proved
before the master.
(c) No Interest in Distribution.-In practically all, if not all,
creditors' suits there are at least two defendants-the debtor and
the person who has the debtor's property. The defendant who has
the property is interested only in holding it against the claims of
the creditors as a group; once he has been ordered to give it up
he loses all interest in it :and it is immaterial to him how it will
be distributed among the creditors. The debtor does have an
interest in seeing that his property is distributed only to those
creditors who have legitimate claims, but in the typical case the
proceeding for proof of claims is but little more than a formality.
In the federal courts and in many of the states claims must be
reduced to judgment before they can be proved, and, so strict is
this rule, it is further required that the judgments be local, as dis-
tinguished from foreign, judgments. The debtor cannot attack
the judgments collaterally and there is little or no occasion for
dispute between the debtor and any individual creditor.
(d) .Representative Suit Required.-The fact that a creditors'
bill such as was filed in Handley v. Stutz could not have been filed
by one creditor in his own behalf alone but could only be main-
tained in behalf of all the creditors, was considered the "more de-
cisive" feature of the case. This fact prevented the suit from
being stigmatized as one in which the plaintiffs had joined merely
for convenience and to save expense.
TAXPAYERS' SUITS
Where an injunction is sought, some of the cases say that the
,amount in controversy is the value of the right or thing which the
complainant seeks to enjoin.:' In most cases, however, the test
has been the value of the right which the complainant seeks to
protect. Where several complainants join in a suit for an injunc-
tion a question often arises as to whether each must have an inter-
est equal to the minimum required for jurisdiction or whether it is
sufficient if the interests of all aggregate such amount. In Russell
v. Stansell land within a particular district had been assessed for
taxation, and three owners for themselves and as members of a
l8Mississippi, etc., R. Co. v. Ward, (1862) 2 Black (U.S.) 485, 492,
17 L. Ed. 311, criticized by Prof. Dobie in (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 733.
19(1881) 105 U. S. 303, 304, 26 L. Ed. 989.
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committee appointed at a mass. meeting of the several owners,
sought to have the collection of the tax enjoined. The amounts
charged against the three named complainants individually were
$7.58, $205.14 and $229.29, and no single individual among all the
parties represented by the committee could in any event be made
liable for an amount exceeding $2,500. The injunction was denied,
and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The appeal was dismissed, Chief Justice Waite saying :19
"While the appellants, and those whom they have been chosen
to represent, are all interested in the question on which their lia-
bility to the appellee depends, they are separately charged with
the several amounts assessed against them. There is no joint re-
sponsibility resting on them as a body . . . .While the appellants
were permitted, for convenience and to save expense, to unite in
a petition setting forth the grievances of which complaint is made,
their object was to relieve each separate owner from 'the amount
for which he personally, or his property, was found accountable.
* . . Such distinct and separate interests cannot be united for the
purpose of making up the amount necessary to give us jurisdiction
on appeal."
In Ogden City v. Arnistrong the facts were much the same as
in Russell v. Stansell, and it was held on the authority of that case
that as the record disclosed that none of the complainants, save
one, was assessed with an amount sufficient to have enabled him to
take the case to the Supreme Court on appeal, the appeal must be
dismissed as to such parties. ° In Rogers v. Hennepin County,
three complainants, for themselves and others like situated (num-
bering altogether five hundred and fifty), sought to enjoin the
collection of a tax under forty dollars assessed against each of
them. Defendants objected that the demands against all could
not be aggregated in order to confer jurisdiction.. The district
court sustained the objection upon authority of Wheless v. St.
Louis2' and the Supreme Court, without discussion, held that it
20(1897) 168 U. S. 224, 18 Sup. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444.
21(1901) 180 U. S. 379, 382, 21 Sup. Ct. 402, 45 L. Ed. 563. In this
case various lots of land threatened with assessment were owned in severalty
and the assessment against no one lot amounted to $2,000. It was held that
the trial court was without jurisdiction. Chief Justice Fuller said: "The
'matter in dispute' within the meaning of the statute is not the principle
involved, but the pecuniary consequence to the individual party .... The
rules of law which might subject complainants to or reliev them from
assessment would be applicable alike to all, but each would be so subjected,
or relieved, in a certain sum, and not in the whole amount of the assess-
ment." It does not appear that a representative suit was employed, but
the court's language seems -broad enough to cover such cases,
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committed no error in so doing.22 In Scott v. Frazier23 the com-
plainants were taxpayers of North Dakota who alleged that the
suit was brought "bn behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers
of the state." There was no allegation that the loss or injury to
any complainant amounted to $3,000 and Mr. Justice Day said:
"It is well settled that in such cases as this the amount in con-
troversy must equal the jurisdictional sum as to each complainant."
In Brown v. Trousdale,24 decided after Russell v. Stansell but
before the other cases cited above, several hundred taxpayers of
a county in Kentucky, for themselves and others associated with
them numbering about 1,200, and on behalf of all other taxpayers
of the county, "and for the benefit likewise of said county," filed
their bill of complaint against certain officers, and all the holders
of the bonds, seeking a decree adjudging the invalidity of two
series of bonds aggregating many hundred thousand dollars, and
perpetually enjoining their collection. An injunction was also
asked as incidental to the principal relief, against the collection
of a particular tax levied to meet the interest on the bonds. It
was argued by counsel for appellees that claims cannot be ag-
gregated to give jurisdiction, e.g. where several creditors unite
in a suit in equity each claiming a pro rata share of common prop-
erty, each creditor's right to appeal depends on his own claim.
The court through Chief Justice Fuller said:
"The main question at issue was the validity of the bonds,
and that involved the levy and collection of taxes for a series
of years to pay interest thereon, and finally the principal thereof,
and not the mere restraining of the tax for a single year. The
grievance complained of was common to all the plaintiffs, and to
all whom they professed to represent. The relief sought could
not be legally injurious to any of the taxpayers of the county, as
such, and the interest of 'those who did not join in or authorize
the suit was identical with the interest of the plaintiffs. The rule
applicable to plaintiffs each claiming under a separate and distinct
right, in respect to a separate and distinct liability and that con-
tested by the adverse party, is not applicable here. For although
as to the tax for the particular year, the injunction sought might
restrain only the amount levied against each, that order was but
preliminary, and was not the main purpose of the bill, but only
incidental. The amount in dispute, in view of the main contro-
versy, far exceeded the limit upon our jurisdiction, and disposes
of the objection of appellees in this regard."
22(1916) 239 U. S. 621, 36 Sup. Ct. 217, 60 L. Ed. 469.
23(1920) 253 U. S. 243, 40 Sup. Ct. 503, 64 L. Ed. 883.
24(1891) 138 U. S. 389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, 34 L. Ed. 987.
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As to the main proceeding the chief justice took pains to point
out that the grievance complained of was common, not only to
the named or original plaintiffs, but to all whom they professed
to represent; that the relief sought could not be legally injurious
to any of the taxpayers of the county; and that the interest of
those who did not join was identical with the interest of those
who did. This language of the chief justice is significant as it
clearly shows that he considered the suit to be one in which one
or more might properly sue for the benefit of all. He did not,
apparently, think it necessary to go further and determine whether
the joinder of plaintiffs was required or was merely for conven-
ience and to save expense. The common interest necessary for
a representative suit being present, the common interest necessary
for aggregation was also present. The suit having been brought
for the benefit of all the taxpayers, the taxes or charges which
the plaintiffs,-i.e. all the taxpayers-sought to escape were in
amount exactly the same as the taxes sought to be collected, i.e.
the amount of the principal and interest on the bonds. This being
true, there was no occasion to do more than glance at the amount
of the bonds to see that the court had jurisdiction of the appeal.
That it was the interest of the complainants and not the value
of the bonds which constituted the amount in dispute in Brown
v. Trousdale seems certain from a remark of the court in a case
decided a few years later. In Colvin v. City of Jacksonville,25
a single taxpayer sought to restrain the issue, sale, etc., of a cer-
tain issue of bonds amounting to $1,000,000. It was held that
the amount of the interest of complainant, and not the entire issue
of bonds, was the amount in controversy. Reference was made
to the case of El Pasa Water Co. v'. City of El Paso,26 decided
subsequent to Brozwn v. Trousdale, in which it had been said:
"The bill is filed by the plaintiff to protect its individual interest,
and to prevent damage to itself. It must therefore affirmatively
appear that the acts charged against the city, and sought to be
enjoined, would result in its damage to an amount in excess of
$5,000."
In the Colvin Case it, was stated that the El Paso Case was de-
cisive, and that Brown v. Trousdale was not to the contrary.
-5(1895) 158 U. S. 456, 15 Sup. Ct. 866, 39 L. Ed. 1053.
20(1894) 152 U. S. 157, 159, 14 Sup. Ct. 494, 38 L. Ed. 396.
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STOCKHOLDERS' SUITS
An appellate division of the supreme court of New York has
said :27
"Representative actions in which one sues for the benefit of
all are very common. Those with which we are most familiar
are not only representative, but derivative in the sense that the
plaintiff sues not in his own right, but in the right of another.
Such are actions by a stockholder in the right of the corporation,
or a creditor in the right of a receiver. The object of all such
actions is to realize a fund to be paid, not directly to the plain-
tiff, but to the corporation, or receiver or other person in whose
right the plaintiff sues, thence to be distributed among those en-
titled to share in it."
Since the object of a stockholders' suit is to assert rights of
the corporation for its benefit and indirectly for the benefit of all
the stockholders it is evident that those bringing the suit cannot
have redress of wrongs done them individually. Whether the
suit is by one stockholder, a few joined, all joined, or one or
more for the benefit of all, the relief asked for is just the same,
viz., protection of some right of the corporation. It is usual
for such suits to be brought as representative suits, but if this
form is not employed the suits ate nevertheless in effect for the
benefit of all.
In Hill v. Glasgow R. C0.2s it was argued that the circuit
court did not have jurisdiction because the complainant's interest
in the controversy did not exceed $2,000. The circuit judge said:
"This position is not well taken. It overlooks and mistakes
the true theory of the bill, which is not the assertion of the com-
plainant's private right, but those of the company in which he
has an interest."
The view expressed in the above case that it is the value of the
interest of the corporation and not the value of the interest of the
individual stockholder which determines jurisdiction has been
stated in a number of other federal cases, 2  and is the accepted
view. Since the interest of the corporation sought to be pro-
tected in a stockholders' suit is exactly equal in value to an aggre-
gate of the interests of all the stockholders asserted in such suit,
27Atkins v. Trowbridge, (1914) 162 App. Div. 629, 636, 148 N. Y. S.
181, 186.
28(C.C. Ky. 1888) 41 Fed. 610, 613.
29Larabee v. Dolley, (C.C. Kan. 1909) 175 Fed. 365; Hutchinson Box
& Paper Co. v. Van Horn, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 299 Fed. 424; Haynes
v. Fraternal Aid Union, (D.C. Kan. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 305. Also see
Carpenter v. Knollwood Cemetery, (D.C. Mass. 1912) 198 Fed. 297.
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it is of no practical importance whether it be said that the one
or the other is the amount involved.
In view of the fact that it is a right of the corporation which
is sought to be protected by a stockholders' suit and in view of
the further fact that any recovery must be for the corporation
and in its name, it may be urged that the corporation is the real
plaintiff in such a case and there is no occasion to consider the
value of the interests of the stockholders who are named and
represented as plaintiffs. Looked at apart from the mechanics
of bringing the suit this would seem -to be true, but it must be
recognized that the stockholders are allowed to sue in their names
because those having authority to sue in the corporation's name
refuse to do so. The corporation must be made a defendant, 30
and where jurisdiction in the federal courts depends on diver-
sity of citizenship the named plaintiffs must not be of the same
state as the defendant corporation.31 While the interests of the
stockholders are secondary and derivative, they are nevertheless
such as may properly give the stockholders the status of plaintiffs
in the case.
There is another type of suit which may be called a "stock-
holders' suit" but which is not derivative in character,--a suit in
which stockholders as such assert rights against the corporation.
A case of this kind was very recently before the circuit court of
appeals, second circuit. 2 Defendant corporation had made to
the common shareholders an offer of the "right" to subscribe
for one share of new stock for every ten shares held by them,
at $45 per share, but later withdrew the offer. One Cohn, owner
of 300 shares, filed a bill "on behalf of himself and any other
shareholders who might join and share the expense of the suit"
asserting that defendant's offer was not revocable, and praying
a declaration that the withdrawal of the offer was unlawful, and
that the defendant be directed to issue the promised warrants.
Two other stockholders intervened as plaintiffs, one, the owner
of 160 shares, and the other, the owner of 4,320 shares. The
court held that Cohn's 300 "rights" were not worth $3,000 on
the date of the filing of the bill; that the value of the first inter-
3OVenner v. Great Northern "Ry., (1909) 209 U. S. 24, 28 Sup. Ct. 328,
52 L. Ed. 666.
31New Jersey Central R. R. v. Mills, (1885) 113 U. S. 249, 5 Sup. Ct.
456, 28 L. Ed. 949.32Cohn v. Cities Service Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 687.
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venor's 160 "rights" could not be "tacked to Cohn's to give juris-
diction, for each spoke in his several right ;" and that the second
intervenor's 4,320 "rights," which alone were sufficient in amount,
could not give jurisdiction because the second intervenor was a
citizen of the same state as the defehdant.
In the above opinion no question was raised as to the pro-
priety of one stockholder's bringing the suit for the benefit of
himself and others. It was assumed apparently that the "ques-
tion" whether the defendant's offer was revocable was one of
"common interest" to the stockholders as a class. How much
is involved in the decision of this common question? If the
decision is made in a proper representative suit and is binding
'on all members of the class, it is easy to see that the amount in
dispute is the value of the "rights" of all stockholders who have
not received their new shares of stock. There may be some doubt
as to whether a judgment in this type of representative suit is
binding on members of the class who did not intervene, but there
is no apparent reason why they should not be bound, especially
if they know of the pendency of the suit in time to intervene.
If, in such a suit, the court should hold that the offer was revo-
cable, could other stockholders raise this question again and again
in separate suits? In this connection it is well to recall the de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble,-3 decided in 1921. In 1913 a citizen of Kentucky and
five hundred and twenty-three other complainants of states other
than Indiana sued the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, an Indiana
society, in the federal district court of Indiana, to enjoin what
was claimed to be an unlawful use of trust funds in which com-
plainants and all other Class-A members had a common but in-
divisible interest. The suit was for the benefit of all Class-A
members numbering more than seventy thousand. A decree in
favor of defendant resulted. Actions against the society were
later brought by Indiana holders of Class-A certificates in the
state courts raising the same questions. The society by ancillary
bill asked the federal court to enjoin these actions, claiming that the
original suit was a class suit and that the rights of the Class-A
holders were fully adjudicated therein. The lower court held
that Indiana citizens were not bound by the decree in the original
suit as such class suit did not include Indiana citizens, for if
33(1921) 255 U. "S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338, 65 'L. Ed. 673.
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it did there was no diversity of citizenship. The Supreme
Court reversed this decision and called attention to the change
in equity Rule S8 omitting a clause which had provided that
decrees in representative suits should be without prejudice to
absent parties. The court felt that it would be very unfortu-
nate if some of a class should be bound by such a decree and
others not.
In whatever court the Cohn Case is tried, if the decree is bind-
ing on all the stockholders, the amount in dispute will be the
value of the interests of the stockholders as a class, and it is
bard to see how the value of the interest of the stockholder who
happens to institute the suit in any way controls or determines
the amount in controversy in the suit.
SUITS TO RECOVER MONEY
When joint obligees are too numerous to be made actual par-
ties to an action, one or more may sue for the benefit of all. 34
In such cases the amount in dispute is the sum due the parties
jointly, and when that sum equals the minimum required for
jurisdiction, it is of no consequence that the interest of each
individual is less than the required amount. Speaking of the
matter in dispute in Shields v. Thomas,35 Chief Justice Taney
said:
"It is like a contract with several to pay a sum of money. It
may be that the money, when recovered, is to be divided between
them in equal or unequal proportions. Yet, if a controversy arises
on the contract, and the sum in dispute upon it exceeds 'two thou-
sand dollars, an appeal would clearly lie to this court, although
the interest of each individual was less than that sum."
Where numerous persons, not joint obligees, have claims for
money against the same defendant involving common questions
of law or fact it may be convenient for some to sue for the benefit
of all. The first of a series of interesting Kentucky cases dealing
with the problem of jurisdictional amount in this type of repre-
sentative suit was Oswald v. Morris8 decided by the court of
appeals of Kentucky in 1891. An action was brought by the
assignee of an insolvent company to ascertain the ownership of
34George v. Benjamin, (1898) 100 Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619; Hodge v.
Nalty, (1899) 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726. These cases should be read
together.
35(1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 3, 15 L. Ed. 93.
36(1891) 92 Ky. 48, 17 S. W. 167.
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whiskey for which the company had issued various warehouse
receipts. The court ordered the claimants to file their warehouse
receipts and, to meet the expense of determining the true owners,
directed that each holder pay a registration fee of ten cents per
barrel. After the ownership had been established four of the
claimants, by answer and cross-petition, sought to recover, for
themselves and all others similarly situated, the money paid to the
assignee, and other sums claimed by them under their warehouse
receipts for leakage, and for taxes paid on such leakage. Judg-
ment was in favor of the claimants for the leakage, and for the
assignee on the other claims. The claimants appealed and there
was a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The
record showed that the registration fund amounted to over $7,000
and the tax on the excess of "outage" to nearly $4,000. It was
argued that since each individual claim of the four claimants
was less than $100 the trial court had no jurisdiction and that the
claims of those suing and represented could not be added to con-
stitute $3,000, the minimum required for an appeal. Without
passing on the question raised as to the trial court's jurisdiction
the court of appeals held that the claims could not be regarded
as a unit for the purpose of an appeal. In reaching its decision
the court held that the parties did not have the common or general
interest required by the provision for representative suits. In
so holding the question of whether claims less than the amount
required for jurisdiction may be aggregated in proper representa-
tive suits to constitute the jurisdictional amount was left undecided.
If any conclusion can be drawn from the opinion on this point,
it is that where the parties have, within the meaning of the code,
"a common or general interest," the claims of those represented
as well as those named as plaintiffs may be considered in deter-
mining jurisdiction. The court said:
"Where there is really within the meaning of the law a com-
mon interest, and one sues for the benefit of all, the consent of
those not parties to the suit is, in the absence of objection from
them, to be presumed.13 7
The next case to be noticed is McCann v. City of Louisville s
decided in 1901. Two suits were brought in the circuit court by
37Also see Flint v. Spurr, (1856) 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 499, where it is
said in syllabus: "Where parties claiming an interest are numerous, and suit
is brought for their benefit, with others who are active in its prosecution,
their assent to its prosecution will be presumed, unless they show their
disapprobation."38(1901) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 558, 63 S. W. 446.
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abutting property owners for themselves and all others to recover
from the city the amounts paid by them to contractors upon ap-
portionment warrants for the cost of construction of sundry dry
cisterns, wells, fire hydrants, and water attachments constructed
according to ordinances of the city. While these actions were
pending thirteen hundred suits were brought in two justice of the
peace courts by individual property owners to recover amounts
paid on similar warrants by each of them respectively. Writs of
prohibition were issued to the justices of the peace restraining them
from trying the thirteen hundred cases. It was held that the two
suits in the circuit court were proper representative suits, the ques-
tion of the right of the property owners who paid the apportion-
ment warrants to recover back the amounts paid involving "a com-
mon or general interest of all who made such payments," dnd the
circuit court having acquired jurisdiction of all such claims, the
justices of the peace had no jurisdiction. It was pointed out by
the court that the purpose of the section authorizing some of a class
to sue for all is "to avoid a multiplicity of suits and settle the rights
of all parties having a common or general interest in one suit."
The question of jurisdictional amount was not discussed, but as
the amounts of the claims filed in the justice courts ranged 'from
$10 to less than $1 it is clear that the circuit court had no jurisdic-
tion of such claims if each claim was to be considered alone in de-
termining the amount required for jurisdiction.
Later in the same year, 1901, Oswald v. Morris was expressly
overruled and the McCann Case followed in the familiar case of
Commonwealth v. Scott"9 . In a well-considered opinion the court
of appeals held, that one of a large number of taxpayers from
whom a tax has been illegally collected may sue for the benefit of
all to recover the sums paid, and that the amount in controversy
in such an action, both in the trial court and for the purpose of an
appeal by plaintiff, is the entire trust fund 0 sued for, and not mere-
39(1901) 112 Ky. 252, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1488, 65 S. W. 596, 55 L. R. A. 597.
4Ot is doubtful that a trust fund was involved. See Whaley v. Comm.,
(1901) 110 Ky. 154, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1292, 61 S. W. 35 where facts of
similar case are given. There is nothing to show what had been done with
the tax money and so far as appears there was no trust res. In the early
case referred to as holding that money collected by illegal taxation is a
trust fund (Blair v. Turnpike Co., (1868) 4 Bush. (Ky.) 157) the term
"trust fund" was very loosely used, the decision being that taxes illegally
collected for a turnpike should not be ordered paid to the turnpike com-
pany but should be held by the sheriff "until otherwise appropriated legal-
ly." The court added gratuitously that the sheriff "holds the money . . .
as a trust fund for the benefit of the taxpayers who contributed that fund."
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ly the amount of plaintiff's share of the fund. The court quoted
at length from Pomeroy's justly-celebrated discussion of the juris-
diction of equity based upon the prevention of a multiplicity of
suits, where he says that "the weight of authority is simply over-
whelming that the jurisdiction may and should be exercised either
on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single
party, or on behalf of a single party against such a numerous body,
although there is no 'common title' nor 'community of right' or of
'interest in the subject-matter,' among these individuals, but wh.re
there is, and because there is, merely a community of interest
among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the gen-
eral controversy."
'41
Some two weeks after the decision of Commonwealth v. Scott
the court handed down its opinion in Gorley. v. City of Louis-
ville42  In this case ten members of the police force sued for
themselves and others to recover compensation for the services of
plaintiffs as policemen. Defendant demurred on the ground that
the circuit court had no jurisdiction "as to the subject of the ac-
tion, neither of the plaintiffs having a claim, as set forth in their
petition, in excess of $50," and on the ground that a representative
suit was not proper. The demurrer was sustained by the trial
court, but the decision was reversed on appeal. The McCann Case
was relied on to show the propriety of employing a representative
suit and having decided this point the court apparently thought it
unnecessary to give further reasons for holding that the lower
court had jurisdiction.
In 1917 a case was before the court of appeals in which several
consumers of gas and electricity, for themselves and all other
consumers within the city, sued the gas and electric company to
recover overcharges. 43 Their several claims aggregated $172, the
largest being fo'r $25, and the smallest for $3. It was objected that
the trial court had no jurisdiction as the claim of no one plaintiff
exceeded the sum of $50. In holding that a representative suit
could not be employed and that the lower court had no jurisdiction
the court of appeals said:
"As the claim of neither plaintiff exceeds $50, the jurisdiction
of the circuit court depended upon the fact whether one or more
of the plaintiffs could sue not only for themselves, but also on
411 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., 4th ed., sec. 269.
42(1901) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1782, 65 S. W. 844, 846.
43Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Mulligan, (1917) 177 Ky. 662,
197 S. W. 1081, 1085.
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behalf of all others having similar claims against the appellant,
and in that way join claims sufficient to aggregate more than $50
in amount."
This statement plainly implies that in those cases where some may
properly sue for all the aggregate of the claims determines juris-
diction, the only difficulty being whether the case is one in which
some may properly represent the rest.
A case very similar to the last one was decided in 1920. Speak-
ing of the code provision allowing some of a class to sue for all
the court said:
"Under all of the authorities, there must be some community
of interest in the subject-matter of the controversy before a court
can exercise in one case jurisdiction over separate claims of dif-
ferent parties under which circumstances the jurisdiction depends,
not upon the amount of one or all of the separate claims, but upon
the amount or character of the subject-matter, that is, in the thing
in which they have the community of interest." 44
It is possible to apply this test to Commonweath v. Scott by con-
sidering the various sums paid by the taxpayers as one trust fund
of which the court took jurisdiction for the purposes of distribution
-a very doubtful view-but how can it be applied in the Gorley
Case in which the policemen sought the amounts due them as
compensation?
In the fairly recent case of Duke v. Boyd County45 three police-
men, in their own behalf and for the use and benefit of about
twenty-five policemen and ex-policemen, sued to recover $6,514.25,
being the aggregate amount of their claims against the county for
arrests made under a statute providing for a fee of $5.00 to be
paid any peace officer making an arrest under the act. It was
held that a representative suit was proper, following the Gorley
Case, but no question as to jurisdictional amount was raised. If
that question had been raised, how could it be said that "jurisdic-
tion depends, not upon the amount of one or all of the separate
claims, but upon the amount or character of the subject-matter,
that is the thing in which they have the community of interest ?"
In this case the 'subject-matter' or 'thing' in which the plaintiffs
had a 'community of interest' was not the separate sums due each
plaintiff but the common question of law involved, viz., whether
the statute in question was constitutional. Where the common in-
terest which makes a representative suit possible is a common
44Batman v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., (1920) 187 Ky. 659, 220
S. W. 318.
46(1928) 225 Ky. 112, 7 S. W. (2d) 839.
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question of law or fact there is no 'subject-matter' or 'thing' which
can be evaluated, and the matter in dispute should be deemed-as it
apparently was in some of the earlier Kentucky cases-to be the
aggregate of the interests of the plaintiffs in the suit.
IDENTITY OF THE COMMON INTERESTS
Two of the most useful tests for determining when the in-
terests of joined, plaintiffs may be considered common and un-
divided for the purpose of federal jurisdiction were applied in
Handley v. Stutz. From what was said in that case and others
it seems fairly safe to say that interests will be deemed common
and undivided when (1) joinder of plaintiffs is required and (2)
there is no occasion for separate contests between the defendants
and individual plaintiffs. It does not follow necessarily, however,
that if these tests are not met the interests will be deemed separate
and distinct.
The first test cannot be applied alone as it may be that joinder
will be required by some arbitrary rule although on the trial there
will be separate contests between the defendants and the individual
plaintiffs.48 The second test cannot be applied alone for there may
be cases in which the contest will be between the defendants and
the plaintiffs as a group, yet, joinder of plaintiffs not being re-
quired, the case will be classified as one in which the plaintiffs are
permitted to unite merely for convenience and to save expense.
In all suits brought properly by some for the benefit of all the
contest is between the plaintiffs as a group on the one hand and the
defendants on the other. There can be no separate contests be-
461n Oliver v. Alexander, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 143, 8 L. Ed. 349,
seamen were required to join in a libel for wages yet it was held that the
demands of the seamen could not be consolidated into an aggregate thus
making the whole matter in dispute. Mr. Justice Story said: "Although
the libel is thus in form joint, the contract is always treated in the admiralty
according to the truth of the case, as a several and distinct contract with
each seaman. Each is to stand or fall by the merits of his own claim, and
is unaffected by those of his co-libellants. The defense which is good
against one seaman, may be wholly inapplicable to another. One may have
been paid; another may not have performed the service; and another may
have forfeited in whole or in part his claim to wages .... The whole pro-
ceeding, therefore, from the beginning to the end of the suit, though it as-
sumes the form of a joint suit; is in reality a mere joinder of distinct
causes of action by distinct parties, growing out of the same contract." In
Seaver v. Biglows, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 208, 18 L. Ed. 595, Mr. Justice
Nelson cited Oliver v. Alexander and remarked that a creditors' bill is
analogous to a proceeding in admiralty in behalf of seamen for wages.
This analogy was far-fetched and unfortunate.
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tween the defendants and individual plaintiffs, except, perhaps, in-
cidentally.or in a collateral proceeding. The plaintiffs constitute, a
'class' and the main contest is between the defendants and that
class. If the second test could be applied alone it would be fairly
safe to say that in all proper representative suits the interests of
the plaintiffs may be aggregated for the purposes of jurisdiction.
But we cannot ignore the view often expressed that claims cannot
be aggregated where joinder of plaintiffs is merely for conven-
ience and to save expense.
The true representative suit as it developed in the old equity
practice was considered an exception to the rule which required
all persons materially interested in the subject-matter or object of
a suit to be made parties to it either as plaintiffs or defendants.47
Since representation was allowed as a substitute for required join-
der, such joinder was not merely for convenience and to save ex-
pense. There developed, however, in equity practice a type of
joinder of parties which was not required, but optional with the
plaintiffs. Among the common situations in which joinder was
deemed permissive were "when owners of separate lands united
to enjoin a common injury or nuisance or the levy of an illegal
tax or rate; when persons injured by the same or identical fraudu-
lent misrepresentations sued to be put in statu quo; and when
creditors who had recovered separate judgments against a common
debtor brought a creditor's bill."48 In most, if not all, of these
situations representative suits may be employed, and it must be
recognized that in such suits joinder is allowed for convenience and
to save expense.
Creditors' suits fall into two distinct groups depending on
whether joinder of plaintiffs is 'permissive' or 'required.' The basis
of this distinction is not found in arbitrary rules of joinder, but
in a consideration of whether the court is called upon to adminis-
ter a fund for the benefit of all the creditors. If such a fund is to
be administered the suit must be in effect, if not in form, for the
benefit of all,49 and in such a case the claims of the plaintiffs may
1-TStory, Eq. Pl. sec. 95.
48Clark, Code Pleading, 248.49 lauch 'v. De Socarras, (1898) 56 N. J. Eq. 524, 527, 39 Atl. 381.
Pitney, V. C., said: "That class of creditors' bills in which the suit can
properly be said to be necessarily brought for the benefit of other creditors
besides the complainant comprise those which seek to reach, establish, and
administer assets in the hands of a trustee, who holds them either volun-
tarily, or, by force of circumstances, involuntarily, for the benefit of all
the creditors. They may be classed as follows:
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be aggregated to constitute the minimum required for jurisdic-
tion. In certain situations, however, two or more creditors may
sue for themselves alone to reach assets of their common debtor
and when such assets are recovered they are not administered for
the benefit of all the creditors but applied only, or at least primarily,
to the payment of the plaintiffs' claims." Joinder in such a suit
is clearly permissive as each creditor could have sued alone.
The objects of the two types of creditors' suits are wholly
dissimilar. In the one there is an interest in having a fund ad-
ministered for the creditors as a class; in the other the plaintiffs
are seeking to have their own judgments satisfied to the exclusion
of the creditors as a class. In the one a representative suit may be
properly employed; in the other such a suit is plainly an impos-
sibility, i. e. without changing the nature of the suit. If, however,
in a situation where some creditors are permitted to sue for their
own benefit alone, they sue for the benefit of all, the character of
the.suit is entirely changed. The suit becomes one to administer
a fund, and is not an equitable levy. it follows, then, that in all.
creditors' suits brought as representative suits the object is to have
a fund administered for the benefit of all the creditors. Whether
"First. Suits to administer the estate of a decedent, held by an ad-
ministrator or executor, and apply the same to the payment of his debt.
"Second. Where a living creditor voluntarily assigns property to a
trustee for the benefit of his creditors, and a creditor seeks to have the
trust administered.
"Third. Where there is an assignment by operation of law for the
equal benefit of the creditors, such as occurred in all instances of attach-
ments against foreign or absconding debtors under our statute, until the
recent change in that respect.
"Fourth. Cases where a creditor of a corporation seeks to reach unpaid
subscriptions to stock...
'-'Fifth. A creditors' bill under our chancery act (sections 88, 94), in
which equitable assets are reached by a receiver, and are all subject to the
debts of the defendant, but are not distributed par passu, and the com-
plainant is first paid."
To the classes thus enumerated should be added other exceptional cases
where the creditor is allowed to pursue his remedy in equity without first
having reduced his claim to judgment. 5 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., 4th ed.
sec. 2317, p. 5137, citing Day v. Washburn, (1860) 24 How. (U.S.) 352,
16 L. Ed. 712.
In Elmore v. Speer, (1858) 27 Ga. 193, 73 Am. Dec. 729, it was said:
"The assets which the creditor proposes to reach are not equitable, but
legal assets .... A single creditor may file a bill to reach legal assets, and
if he gains thereby a priority over other creditors, he will be entitled to
retain it .... And when a single creditor is in pursuit of legal assets he can-
not be forced to divide with other creditors. It is otherwise with equitable
assets."5
°Iauch v. De Socarras, (1898) 56 N. J. Eq. 524, 39 Atl. 381. Also see
Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, (1884) 110 U. S. 710, 716, 4
Sup. Ct. 226, 28 L. Ed. 301.
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the representative suit be one in which joinder is 'required' or one
in which joinder is 'permissive' the object of the suit is just the
same and the nature of the common interest is just the same. If
the common interest in a 'required joinder' case is such as will per-
mit the claims of the creditors to be aggregated for the purposes
of jurisdiction, it is hard to see why the same common interest in
a 'permissive' joinder case should not likewise permit aggregation.
In considering the nature of the interest of the plaintiffs in
a taxpayers' suit it should be noted that an injunction may be
sought "to prevent the creation of a debt which will necessarily re-
sult in increased taxation, to prevent the levy of a tax, to pre-
vent a contemplated or pending assessment of a tax, to prevent the
collection of a tax already assessed, to prevent a tax sale of lands,
to restrain the issuance of a tax-deed," etc.51 It is obvious that
the rule as to who may or should be parties to the suit will depend
largely on the stage of the proceedings at which the relief is sought.
In the early stages the interests of all the taxpayers are closely unit-
ed, while at the later stages they become separate and distinct.
Where injunctions have been sought at the earliest stage, i. e., to
prevent the creation of a debt which will necessarily result in in-
creased taxation, it has been seriously argued that the grievance
is purely a public grievance to be redressed on the application of
the proper public authorities.5 2 In a case at circuit in which a single
taxpayer had sought to enjoin state officers from executing and
issuing bonds intended as a donation to a railroad Mr. Justice
Bradley denied the injunction because he thought that a man
could not maintain a private suit for an injury sustained in com-
mon with every other citizen. 53  Where injunctions have been
sought at a later stage, e. g., to prevent the collection of a tac al-
ready assessed, the rights to be protected have become so far dis-
tinct as to make it doubtful whether complaining taxpayers may
properly join in such a suit or some sue for the benefit of all.
In Cutting v. Gilbert54 a bill had been filed by several bankers, as
well for themselves as all others in the same interest, to restrain the
collection of certain internal revenue taxes. While recognizing
514 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., sec. 1656.
524 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., sec. 1657.53Morgan v. Graham, (C.C. 5th Cir. 1871) 1 Woods 124. In this con-
nection see Crampton v. Zabriskie, (1879) 101 U. S. 601, 609, 25 L. Ed. 1070.
54(C.C.N.Y. 1865) '5 Blatch. 259, 261, Fed. Cas. No. 3,519, quoted from
with approval by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Donald, (1897) 165 U. S.
107, 115, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41 L. Ed. 648.
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the desirability of preventing a multiplicity of suits it was held that
the complainants could not join in the petition for injunction. In
Kvello v. City of Lisbon, decided by the supreme court of North
Dakota in 1917, it was held that while one assessed owner might
sue for himself and others to enjoin the collection of an assess-
ment, it was error to enjoin collection from owners who had not
actually come in and made themselves parties to the suit.
In determining whether the interests of the plaintiffs in a tax-
payers' suit are sufficiently common and undivided to allow them
to be aggregated for the purposes of jurisdiction, the stage of the
tax procedure should be of controlling importance. In the early
stages the interests are so closely united that it may be impossible
to determine'the value of an individual interest. In the later
stages the interests become separate and distinct. The real prob-
lem is determining where to draw the line. It is the writer's view
that the line should be drawn at the same place that it is drawn
in determining whether a representative suit may be employed.
If the taxpayers have a common interest that will make it proper
for some to sue for the benefit of all they should be deemed to have
a common interest for the purposes of jurisdiction.
In suits by stockholders brought to assert some right of the
corporation it is clear that the plaintiffs "unite to enforce a single
title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest."
It is this same common interest which makes it proper, if not neces-
sary, for the suit to be brought as a representative suit for the
benefit of all.
In suits to recover money if the plaintiffs have a joint right it
is easy to see that the common and undivided interest which de-
termines jurisdiction is the same commoff and undivided interest
which requires joinder of plaintiffs or a representative suit where
the plaintiffs are too numerous to be named as actual parties on
the record. Where the plaintiffs are not joint obligees there is
much doubt as to whether they can join at all in one action to recov-
er their respective claims, to say nothing of allowing some to sue
for the benefit of all. Where such a representative suit is per-
mitted, as in Kentucky, (according to some of the cases) the in-
terest which makes such a suit possible is apparently an interest in
some common question of law or fact. As suggested above, the
amount in dispute in such a case should be deemed to be the ag-
gregate of the interests of the plaintiffs in the siit.
55(1917) 38 N. D. 71, 164 N. W. 305, 310, 315.
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QUESTIONS OF POLICY
In many situations it is exceedingly difficult to determine wheth-
er the interests of the plaintiffs are sufficiently common and un-
divided to allow them to be aggregated for the purposes of juris-
diction. It is equally difficult to decide whether one should be al-
lowed to sue for the benefit of all. In determining when a repre-
sentative suit may be properly employed the courts are concerned
with substantial idefitity of interest and not with formal or techni-
cal rules of joinder. Before some may sue for all, the parties be-
fore the court and those represented must be in the same situation
and alike interested in having the questions involved-in the case
decided a particular way. Having decided that there is a com-
mon interest that will permit the use of a representative suit, it
seems wholly unnecessary to go further and try to decide whether
joinder is required or is merely for convenience and to save ex-
pense. A distinction between 'required' and 'permissive' joinder
seems artificial when compared with the substantial considerations
which enter into a determination of whether a representative suit
may or may not be employed.
While it is plausible to say that persons should not, at will, by
merely uniting in an action, be allowed to create an interest equal
to the minimum required for jurisdiction, other questions of policy
must be considered. Whether the considerations which have led
legislative bodies to limit the jurisdiction of certain courts to
cases involving more than a certain amount, have been to save
those courts labor, or to uphold their dignity, or to prevent liti-
gants from injuring themselves by setting in motion more ex-
pensive machinery than needed for the protection of their rights,
it seems certain that none of these reasons apply to representa-
tive suits in which the interests of the plaintiffs as a class aggre-
gate the required amount. In a case like Rogers v. Hennepin
County c where three complainants for themselves and others like
situated (numbering altogether five hundred and fifty) sought to
enjoin the collection of a tax under $40 assessed against each of
them, the total amount involved would be well worth the attention
of a busy superior court; the question, viz., the validity of the
tax, would not be beneath its dignity; and, if the plaintiffs were
allowed to proceed by means of a representative suit, the expense
would likely be shared by many. What might happen in a state
56(1916) 239 U. S. 621, 36 Sup. Ct. 217, 60 L Ed. 469.
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having a minimum requirement and not allowing aggregation was
pointed out long ago by the New York court for the trial of im-
peachments and the correction of errors. The chief justice called
attention to the fact that judgments rendered in justices' courts
were said to total more than judgments rendered in the supreme
court and pointed out that if creditors having such judgments
could not obtain the aid of a court of equity "a great amount of
property might be fraudulently disposed of 'rith impunity."' 7
57Bailey v. Burton, (1831) 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 339.
